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Foreword
The situation analyzed in this paper is typical for many applications including emission
trading, pollution negotiations, financial and insurance markets, production planning un-
der uncertainties control. While modeling the corresponding decision problems one often
considers agents that must cope with uncertain demand and supply. Each of such indi-
vidual has a payoff function, and all functions have values in a common unit. A rational
strategy of the agents facing diversified uncertainties (resulting in potentially substantial
volatility of payoff function values) is to agree upon a cooperation aiming at sharing the
risks.
The analysis proposed in this IR is based on directly linking the risk sharing to coop-
erative mutually beneficial contract (core solution). This approach therefore goes beyond
analysis of Pareto-optimality. Moreover, no assumptions are required about the individual
payoff in terms of concavity, differentiability, monotonicity, or non-satiation. Instead of
the standard fixed-point arguments typical for general equilibrium models, this IR pro-
poses a novel approach based on a simple and standard elegant analyses entirely relying
on optimization theory with its powerful computational methods. In particular, it exploits
the duality theory to address pricing of risks similar to the well known so called two-
fund separation that characterizes equilibrium in capital asset pricing models. Therefore
the results summarized in this paper offer an efficient approach to analysis of a class of
problems in integrated risk management.
This report also describes a part of the research done by Sjur D. Fla˚m when he was a
visiting scholar with the Integrated Modeling Environment Project.
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Abstract
Risk exchange is considered here as a cooperative game with transferable utility. The set-
up fits markets for insurance, securities and contingent endowments. When convoluted
payoff is concave at the aggregate endowment, there is a price-supported core solution.
Under variance aversion the latter mirrors the two-fund separation in allocating to each
agent some sure holding plus a fraction of the aggregate.
Keywords: securities, mutual insurance, market or production games, transferable util-
ity, extremal convolution, core solutions, variance or risk aversion, two-fund separation,
CAPM.
JEL Classification: C61, G11, G12, G13; Math. Subject Classification: 90C30, 91A12,
91B28.
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Risk Exchange as a Market or Production Game
Anders Borglin (Anders.Borglin@nek.lu.se)*
Sjur D. Fla˚m (sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no)** ***
1 Introduction
Many economic agents face risky endowments or commitments. Then, to mitigate ups
and downs, it appears prudent to pool risks - often many and material in nature - and
share them thereafter. For its viability the sharing had better be contingent, efficient and
voluntary.
Along such lines, albeit in a purely pecuniary setting, Borch (1962) showed that rein-
surance contracts may mirror a competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy.1 By
the first fundamental welfare theorem, given non-satiated consumers, any equilibrium of
that sort resides in the core. Indicated thus is an indirect connection between risk/security
markets and cooperative games. Apart from [5], [7], [28], [35], and [39] direct connec-
tions have hardly been emphasized. In fact, even the most tractable instances, featuring
transferable utility (TU), have received almost no attention. Yet such instances could
serve a few good ends.
Accordingly, presuming TU, this paper probes beyond Pareto-optimality [1], [6], [19],
[20], [37], [38] by linking risk exchange directly to cooperative contracts. One bonus
comes by connecting reciprocal treaties closer to asset pricing theory [2], [14]. Another
is to generate not only equilibrating prices but also slopes of the resulting curves. On a
more technical note, no fixed point arguments are needed for existence of a core solution.
Instead it suffices that Lagrangian duality be attained with no gap. This makes for easier
analysis and computation. In addition, concerns about existence of equilibrium prices
become fully divorced from those regarding equilibrium allocations.
To set the stage Section 2 introduces, by way of examples, a market game in order to
recall what is meant by a core solution. Section 3 identifies weak conditions under which
such solutions can be found merely in terms of shadow prices on the aggregate endow-
ment/risk. Section 4 elaborates on the nature and existence of shadow prices. Section 5
digresses to supplement the market perspective by regarding cooperation alternatively as
a production game. After so much groundwork, Sections 6&7 address pricing and shar-
ing of risk. Some results align perfectly with the two-fund separation that characterizes
equilibrium in capital asset pricing models. Section 8 considers the resulting price curves
and tolerances for risk. Section 9 concludes with some examples.
*Nationalekonomiska inst., Lund University.
**Corresponding author.
***Economics Department, Bergen University, Norway.
1For related studies, see [11], [30], [31].
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The paper addresses several types of readers. Included are actuaries, finance analysts
or general economists interested in risk exchange, but not quite knowing how nicely La-
grangian duality produces explicit core outcomes. Also addressed are mathematicians
interested in optimization, but less informed as to how extremal convolution relates to
exchange markets.
2 The Game
Accommodated henceforth is a fixed, finite set I of economic agents. For background
and motivation consider two different settings:
Electricity generation: Plant i ∈ I has promised to deliver the energy amount ei(s) in
(season, site or) state s ∈ S. Since one plant uses hydro-power based on short term pre-
cipitation, its production capacity is highly variable. Because another hydro-based plant
merely draws melting water from under a glacier, it is practically non-operative during
cold winters - but well furnished in hot summers. A third supplier owns a thermal station.
By helping each other these plants may, in each state s, more easily satisfy the total com-
mitment eI(s) :=
∑
i∈I ei(s). How should the overall load then be allocated? And what
payments would induce voluntary cooperation?
Exchange of catch quotas: Fisherman i ∈ I is allowed to catch the amount eij(s) of
species j ∈ J in state or season s ∈ S. Since his gear selects merely one specific species,
he wants to exchange his allowances in other species for the one he wants. When trade is
mediated by money, what exchange rates are reasonable?
In short, we think of firms that must cope with uncertain product demand or random
factor supply. Firm or individual i ∈ I owns (production commitment or resource) en-
dowment ei. For the sake of generality - and for simple presentation - ei is construed, until
Section 6, simply as a vector in some real linear spaceX.2
Individual i has payoff function pii :X→ R∪{−∞}. The extreme value−∞ reports
infinite loss, or total dissatisfaction, or violation of implicit constraints. This device helps
highlighting essential features and saves special mention of the effective domain
dompii := {xi ∈ X : pii(xi) > −∞}
to which any feasible choice xi must belong. Until further notice, no sort of concavity,
differentiability, monotonicity or non-satiation is required of pii. Also, we impose no
particular functional form.3 We presume however, that individual payoff be metered in
money or some common unit of account. This feature is crucial for what follows in that
utility must be transferable.4
2When J, S are finite sets, the above example of electricity generation gives ei ∈ X: = RS , whereas
the fisheries example has ei ∈X: = RJ×S .
3But clearly, objectives of ordinary or Choquet integral form are accommodated [13].
4At least two settings justify use of monetary payoff. In a first, i is a producer who obtains pecu-
niary payoff pii(xi) from input bundle xi ∈ X. In another, i is a consumer who enjoys quasi-linear utility
pii(x
a
i
, x−a
i
) = xa
i
+pia
i
(x−a
i
) from profile xi = (xai , x
−a
i
), the a-th component of which refers to a common
real-valued unit of account.
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Now, rather than everybody contending with his own endowment, the parties might
agree upon some reallocation. In fact, the aggregate eI :=
∑
i∈I ei can most likely be
split in ways that better suit the needs of everyone. So, we ask: can the agents write an
efficient, socially stable contract? And if so, what will be its nature? For the argument,
suppose the members of a coalition C ⊆ I be able to cooperate among themselves. If
endowments are perfectly divisible and freely transferable,5 that coalition could foresee
overall payoff
piC(eC) := sup
{∑
i∈C
pii(xi) :
∑
i∈C
xi =
∑
i∈C
ei =: eC
}
. (1)
Construction (1), called a sup-convolution, tacitly presumes that no member of C misrep-
resents his payoff function or endowment to own advantage. Thus, strategic communi-
cation is precluded. This assumption can be justified if the underlying data are common
knowledge, or readily observed, or honestly reported. Suppose henceforth that the grand
payoff piI(eI) is finite.
The potential advantages of enterprise (1) are evident and twofold. First, aggregation
offers the agents increased leeway and better substitution possibilities. Second, depending
on the setting, it may facilitate transfers across time and contingencies. So, a key issue is
whether the grand coalition C = I can agree upon ways to share the aggregate endow-
ment. Plainly, formation of that coalition requires that proceeds be distributed in ways not
blocked by any subgroup. Reflecting on this concern, a payoff distribution u = (ui) ∈ RI
is declared a core solution iff it entails{
Pareto efficiency: ∑i∈I ui = piI(eI) and
stability:
∑
i∈C ui ≥ piC(eC) for each coalition C ⊂ I.
Stability is easily achieved. Simply let payments be so wonderfully large that
∑
i∈C ui ≥
piC(eC), ∀C ⊆ I. Thus, the essential difficulty hides in the requirement that total payoff
be efficient and not handed out excessively.
The core as solution concept, although central to cooperative game theory, does not
figure prominently in the finance or insurance literature.6 Construction (1) mimics the
classical Shapley-Shubik (1969) analysis of market or production games. If all pii are
concave, the cooperative incentives become so strong and well distributed that the grand
coalition can safely form. To wit, the game - and every subgame - then has non-empty
core:
Proposition (Concave objectives make the game totally balanced).7 Suppose each pii
is concave and all values piC(eC), C ⊆ I, are finite. Then the TU cooperative game,
featuring characteristic function C ⊆ I 7→ piC(eC) is totally balanced. That is, each
subgame, restricted to any coalition C ⊆ I, has non-empty core. 
5Fixed factors are neither pooled nor exchanged.
6Exceptions include [2], [5], [7], [27], [28].
7This result appears well known and is therefore stated without proof.
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3 Price-Generated Core Solutions
The preceding proposition is less than satisfying on two accounts. First, one would like to
push beyond mere existence and seek some specific, computable core element. Second,
one wonders whether less concavity would suffice. For these purposes write x = (xi) ∈
X
I for the profile i 7→ xi. Further, let x∗ : X→ R be any linear functional, and associate
the standard Lagrangian
LC(x, x
∗) :=
∑
i∈C
pii(xi) + x
∗(
∑
i∈C
ei −
∑
i∈C
xi)
to problem (1). To simplify notation we henceforth write x∗x instead of x∗(x).
Definition (Shadow prices). Any linear λ : X→ R such that piI(eI) ≥ supx LI(x, λ)
will be named a Lagrange multiplier or shadow price. 
The next section discusses existence of shadow prices. Here we note that λ qualifies
as shadow price iff piI(eI) is a saddle value of LI in that
piI(eI) = inf
x∗
sup
x
LI(x, x
∗) = sup
x
inf
x∗
LI(x, x
∗).
In fact, these equalities - as well as piI(eI) = supx LI(x, λ) - follow from
piI(eI) ≥ sup
x
LI(x, λ) ≥ inf
x∗
sup
x
LI(x, x
∗) ≥ sup
x
inf
x∗
LI(x, x
∗) ≥ piI(eI).
To better appreciate shadow prices let the convex function
f (∗)(x∗) := sup {f(x)− x∗x : x ∈ X} (2)
denote a conjugate of f : X→ R∪{−∞} .8 The last section provides some examples.
Conjugates are central in the following
Theorem (Shadow prices support core solutions). Let λ be a shadow price. Then the
payoff distribution that offers agent i the amount
ui(λ) := pi
(∗)
i (λ) + λei (3)
constitutes a core solution.
Proof. The argument is surprisingly short and simple. It was already given in [16] for
cost sharing but is reproduced here for profit sharing - and for completeness. Note that
given any linear price x∗ : X→ R and coalition C ⊆ I it holds
sup
x
LC(x, x
∗) =
∑
i∈C
ui(x
∗).
8In terms of the Fenchel conjugate f∗(x∗) := supx {x∗x− f(x)} , one has f(∗)(x∗) = (−f)∗(−x∗);
see [33]. Definition (2) suits here because it reflects price-taking in factor markets and the pursuit of profit.
Specifically, if input x ∈Xcomes at linear cost x∗x, and yields revenue f(x), then the maximal economic
rent is f(∗)(x∗). IfXis locally convex topological, and f is proper, upper semicontinuous, concave, then
f(x) = inf
{
f(∗)(x∗) + x∗x : x∗ continuous linear
}
.
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Thus, social stability obtains for arbitrary x∗ because coalition C receives∑
i∈C
ui(x
∗) = sup
x
LC(x, x
∗) ≥ inf
x∗
sup
x
LC(x, x
∗) ≥ sup
x
inf
x∗
LC(x, x
∗) = piC(eC).
The very last inequality, which holds without any qualifications, is often referred to as
weak duality.9 In particular,
∑
i∈I ui(λ) ≥ piI(eI). The hypothesis on λ ensures the re-
verse inequality - commonly called strong duality. Thereby Pareto efficiency obtains as
well:
∑
i∈I ui(λ) = piI(eI). 
The above result, while adding to [8], [34], [37], can serve as spring-board for several
extensions; see [16] and references therein.
For interpretation, if λ prices ”input” xi, and agent i acts as price-taker in factor mar-
kets, core solution (3) offers him profit pi(∗)i (λ) plus payment λei for his endowment. As
customary, a price λ should equal marginal payoffs. That feature is explored next.
4 The Nature and Existence of Shadow Prices
Our approach makes room for non-smooth functions, several goods, constrained choice
- and for preferences that need not be of the expected utility format.10 These feature
notwithstanding, we want to regard shadow prices as marginal payoffs - that is, as deriva-
tives, possibly generalized. For the statement, denote by ∂ the superdifferential of convex
analysis [33]. That is, given any proper function f : X→ R∪{−∞} , a linear mapping
x∗ :X→ R is called a supergradient of f at x, and we write x∗ ∈ ∂f(x), iff
f(xˆ) ≤ f(x) + x∗(xˆ− x) ∀xˆ ∈ X.
Thus, x∗ ∈ ∂f(x) iff the affine function f(x) + x∗(· − x) globally overestimates f(·)
but with no discrepancy at x. What comes next is a crucial characterization of shadow
prices. For brevity declare x = (xi) ∈ XI an optimal allocation iff
∑
i∈I [xi, pii(xi)] =
[eI, piI(eI)] .
Theorem (Shadow prices as supergradients).
• λ is a shadow price iff λ ∈ ∂piI(eI). Thus, given the payoff functions, a shadow price
depends only on the aggregate endowment eI.
• For any λ ∈ ∂piI(eI) and any optimal allocation (xi) we have λ ∈ ∂pii(xi) for all i.
Conversely, if some λ belongs to all ∂pii(xi) and ∑i xi = eI, then λ is a shadow price,
and allocation (xi) is optimal.
• Suppose some pii is monotone at a point xi with respect to a cone Xi ⊆ X in that
9Note that sup
x
LC (x, x
∗) ≥ piC(eC ) holds for any functional x∗ :X→ R that satisfies x∗(0) ≥ 0. If
moreover, x∗ is additive, then
∑
i∈C
ui(x
∗) = sup
x
LC (x, x
∗). Also, if for some class X∗ of functionals
x∗ :X→ R it holds
inf {x∗x : x∗ ∈ X∗} =
{
0 for x = 0
−∞ otherwise,
then sup
x
infx∗∈X∗ LC (x, x
∗) = piC(eC ).
10For recent studies involving one good and smooth objectives see [35] and [39].
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pi(xi +Xi) ≥ pii(xi) > −∞. Then λXi ≥ 0 for each shadow price λ.
Proof. These assertions are well known when all pii are concave; see e.g. the nice presen-
tation is [25]. Here, however, concavity is not presumed. So, some extra work is needed.
For simplicity define the ”death” penalty δ(·) on X by δ(x) = +∞ when x 6= 0 and
δ(0) = 0. Note that this function has Fenchel conjugate δ∗(x∗) := supx {x∗x− δ(x)} ≡
0. Now, λ ∈ ∂piI(eI)
⇔
∑
i∈I
pii(xi)− δ(
∑
i∈I
xi − x) ≤ piI(x) ≤ piI(eI) + λ(x− eI) ∀x ∈ X,∀(xi) ∈ XI
⇔
∑
i∈I
pii(xi) +
∑
i∈I
λ(ei − xi) + λ(
∑
i∈I
xi − x)− δ(
∑
i∈I
xi − x) ≤ piI(eI) ∀x, ∀(xi)
⇔
∑
i∈I
{pii(xi) + λ(ei − xi)}+ δ∗(λ) ≤ piI(eI) ∀(xi) ∈ XI (*)
⇔ sup
x
LI(x, λ) ≤ piI(eI).
This proves the first bullet. For the second let (x˜i) be any optimal allocation. In the above
string of equivalences (*) says
λ ∈ ∂piI(eI)⇔
∑
i∈I
pii(xi) ≤
∑
i
{pii(x˜i) + λ(xi − x˜i)} ∀(xi) ∈ XI
⇔ pii(xi) ≤ pii(x˜i) + λ(xi − x˜i) ∀xi ∈ X,∀i⇔ λ ∈ ∂pii(x˜i) ∀i.
For the last bullet, if λxˆi < 0 at some xˆi ∈ Xi, then
pi(∗)i (λ) ≥ sup
r>0
{pii(xi + rxˆi)− λ(xi + rxˆi)} = +∞, (4)
which is impossible. 
The instance with all pii concave stands out, making piI concave. Then, provided some
term pii be strictly concave, the optimal xi, if any, must be unique. Moreover, if that
same pii is differentiable at xi, the shadow price becomes unique as well. Generally,
for any shadow price λ and optimal allocation (xi), we get xi ∈ ∂(−pi(∗)i )(λ) and eI ∈
∂(−pi(∗)I )(λ).
We emphasize that concavity of pii or piI is not essential. What imports is rather to
have global support of piI from above at eI by some affine function. Such support cannot
come about unless every optimal allocation (xi) entails quite similar support of pii at xi.
Thus, no agent having strictly convex payoff pii could be admitted here. In fact, if pii is
supported from above as just described, it could not be globally convex unless affine with
slope λ. These observations beg questions as to whether and when shadow prices do exist:
Proposition (Existence of shadow prices). Let X be a locally convex Hausdorff topo-
logical vector space. Denote by pˆiI : X→ R∪{−∞} the smallest concave function that
dominates piI from above. Suppose
pˆiI(·) is finite-valued, bounded below near eI. (5)
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Also suppose that the convoluted preference is convex at eI , meaning that pˆiI(eI) =
piI(eI). Then there exists at least one shadow price shadow price. Moreover that price is
continuous.
Proof. Qualification (5) ensures that the concave function pˆiI(·) is super-differentiable
at eI. That is, ∂pˆiI(eI) is non-empty, and it can be taken to consists of only continuous
linear functionals x∗ : X→ R; see [15]. Now, pˆiI ≥ piI and pˆiI(eI) = piI(eI) implies
∂pˆiI(eI) ⊆ ∂piI(eI). The desired conclusion follows straightforwardly by noting that any
supergradient λ ∈ ∂piI(eI) is a shadow price - as pointed out in the preceding theorem. 
Thus arbitrage-free pricing obtains if an affine function supports the convoluted payoff
from above at that the aggregate endowment. Assumption (5) clarifies that individual
payoffs really need not be convex. Rather, it suffices that piI has appropriate curvature
with respect to eI. Like in [36] aggregative convexity is what counts in preferences - al-
beit here only at eI . This point bears on the qualitative fact that having many and small
agents may mitigate adverse effects of non-convex preferences [3], [16], [18]. As in [23]
heterogeneity can also help.11
When will no shadow price exist? Plainly, as brought out in the last theorem, none is
available if infx∗ supx LI(x, x∗) > piI(eI). Then, the duality gap
∆ := inf
x∗
sup
x
LI(x, x
∗)− piI(eI)
equals the smallest overall budgetary deficit - or the minimal overspending - that could
possibly emerge by paying players according to formula (3). A positive gap might stem
from some payoff function not being concave. Present many small players, each prefer-
ably having a smooth payoff functions, one may show that ∆ becomes relatively small;
see [3], [16], [18]. In any case, apart from existence of shadow prices, it is natural to
wonder whether an optimal allocation (xi) is available for the grand coalition C = I.
Proposition (Existence of optimal allocations). Let Xbe a reflexive Banach space. Sup-
pose the upper-level set
U(r) :=
{
x = (xi) ∈ XI :
∑
i∈I
pii(xi) ≥ r,
∑
i∈I
xi = eI
}
is bounded and weakly closed for every real r < piI(eI). Then there exists an optimal
allocation. In particular, if (xi) 7→
∑
i pii(xi) is quasi-concave upper semi-continuous, it
suffices that each set U(r) be bounded.
Proof. The closed convex hull of U(r) is bounded whence weakly compact for r <
piI(eI). Then, by reflexivity,U(r) itself is weakly compact. It follows that∩r {U(r) : r < piI(eI)}
must be non-empty. Any element x in that intersection solves problem (1) for the grand
coalition. When (xi) 7→
∑
i∈I pii(xi) is quasi-concave upper semi-continuous, U(r) be-
comes closed convex whence weakly closed. 
Clearly, optimal allocations do not depend on the endowment distribution.
11For instance, let pii be ”concave” but defined on a disconnected domain Di. Specifically, take I =
{0, 1}, D0 = {0} ∪ [1/2, 1] , and D1 = [0, 1/2]∪ {1} . Then piI is concave on its domain [0, 2] .
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5 Production Games
This section offers a brief - and dispensable - digression, meant to emphasize three fea-
tures:
• first, sharing of production and profit also fits format (1);
• second, (1) might emerge as a reduced model; and
• third, it is often convenient to keep original data pretty much in original, raw form.
For these purposes regard each agent i ∈ I here as a producer who obtains profit
fi(zi) from plan zi ∈ Zi provided gi(zi) ≤ ei. The set Zi may lack exploitable structure,
and gi : Zi → Xaccounts for technological restrictions or material bounds. The linear
space X is now ordered by a convex cone X+ ⊂ X in that x ≤ x′ ⇔ x′ − x ∈ X+.
Corresponding to (1) consider the planning problem
piC(eC) := sup
{∑
i∈C
fi(zi) : zi ∈ Zi and
∑
i∈C
gi(zi) ≤
∑
i∈C
ei
}
(6)
of coalition C ⊆ I. Its members share not only resources, but technologies as well. Upon
setting pii(xi) := sup {fi(zi) : zi ∈ Zi and gi(zi) ≤ xi} , format (1) comes up again as
a reduced model. There is no need however, to synthesize the characteristic function
C 7→ piC(eC). Computation could merely revolve around piI(eI) - with all data kept in
original form. This is seen next.
When zi ∈ Zi, and the linear functional x∗ : X→ R is non-negative on X+, let
z = (zi), and associate to (6) the Lagrangian
LC(z, x∗) :=
∑
i∈C
{fi(zi) + x∗ [ei − gi(zi)]} .
Write here
ui(x
∗) := sup {fi(zi)− x∗gi(zi) : zi ∈ Zi}+ x∗ei (7)
and note that supz LC(z, x∗) =
∑
i∈C ui(x
∗). Arguing verbatim as for the first theorem
we get
Proposition (Shadow prices support core solutions in production games). Let λ be a
shadow price in that piI(eI) ≥ supz LI(z, λ). Then, paying agent i the amount (7) consti-
tutes a core solution of the TU game that has (6) as characteristic function. 
6 Arbitrage-free, Risk-neutral Pricing
It is time now to specify a more detailed setting and seek some structure in optimal al-
locations. More details are available in two ways. First, the space Xshould be specified
more closely; second, one might reasonable suppose some separability in the objectives
across stages or states.
We begin withX. Fix hereafter a non-empty state space S, equipped with a complete
sigma-field F and a finite non-negative measure µ.12 From here on each x ∈ Xis at least
12When computation is a main concern, one would typically choose S finite, let σ contain all subsets of
S, and have µ(s) > 0 ∀s. Some convenience or flexibility comes with not insisting on µ(S) = 1.
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a F -measurable mapping from S into a finite-dimensional Euclidean space E . The latter
is endowed with inner product e · e′, associated norm |·|, and the Borel sigma-field in E is
generated by the open sets.13 Fix some number p ∈ [1,+∞) and suppose
‖x‖ :=
(∫
|x(s)|p µ(ds)
)1/p
< +∞
for all x ∈ X. Thus X is contained in the space Lp of all F -measurable, p-integrable
x : S → E. Risk or security markets are chief cases - and often incomplete. Xmay
therefore be a strict, but presumably closed subset of Lp.
Define the conjugate exponent p∗ ∈ [1,+∞] implicitly by 1
p
+ 1
p∗
= 1. A theorem of
Riez says that any continuous linear functional x∗ on Xadmits a representation
x 7→ x∗x :=
∫
x∗(s) · x(s)µ(ds) (8)
for an (almost surely) unique x∗ ∈ X∗ ⊇ Lp∗. It is convenient to identify any such
functional x∗ with its Riez representation. The instance p = 2 stands out with p∗ = 2
because X= X∗ becomes Hilbert with inner product (8).14
The present setting may naturally be construed as reflecting uncertainty about the true
state s ∈ S, known ex ante only up to a probability measure µ on F . Any x ∈ X is
then a random vector x(·) ∈ E and accordingly referred to as a risk.15 As said, Xshould
contain the already given endowments ei, i ∈ I, and might - as a minimal requirement -
even be spanned by these. Whilst insurance theory often assumes independent or weakly
associated risks, no such assumption is made here.16
Recall that a shadow price λ is a linear functional from Xinto R. While endogenous
to the game, it helps players to evaluate various risks and securities. Clearly, unless λ
blocks arbitrage it can’t apply as price regime. That issue is briefly explored next.
For the statement, a cone Xi(xi) ⊂ Xis said to comprise the preferable directions of
agent i at xi ∈ Xif pii(xi+Xi(xi)) ≥ pii(xi) > −∞. As usual, a linear price x∗ : X→ R
is declared arbitrage-free iff no agent i has a preferable direction di ∈ Xi(xi) at any
xi ∈ dompii such that x∗di < 0. Arguing as around (4) we may state forthwith:
Proposition (Shadow prices are arbitrage-free). Given cones Xi(xi), i ∈ I, of prefer-
able directions, each shadow price λ must satisfy
λ(∪i∈I ∪xi∈dompii Xi(xi)) ≥ 0.
In particular, if dompii itself is a coneXi, and pii(xi +Xi) ≥ pii(xi) at each xi ∈ Xi, then
λ(∪i∈IXi) ≥ 0. 
13More generally, E could be a separable Hilbert space.
14In particular, the conjugate pair (p, p∗) = (1,+∞) is possible, ‖x‖ then being the essential supremum
of s 7→ |x(s)| . However, unless σ is finite, the ”reciprocal” pair (p, p∗) = (+∞, 1) needs special care, and
is not discussed here; see [17].
15Risks - alias random variables - are chief objects here. Our results extend however, to other contingent
items.
16Consequently, we shall invoke no law of large numbers or central limit theorem. In fact, our analysis
is applicable for major events, say catastrophes, inflicting severe and highly correlated losses.
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Arbitrage is a utility-free, more primitive concept than economic equilibrium. Typically,
it is described in terms of a common family of financial instruments, monotone prefer-
ences, and one punctuated convex cone X+ {0} ⊂ X, composed of free lunches. A
theorem of alternatives then decides whether arbitrage is possible or not. Given a shadow
price that decision is straightforward:
Proposition (Shadow prices preclude free lunches). Let xi ∈ X iff xi = ei + Wzi for
some ”portfolio” zi in a real vector space Z, with W : Z→ X linear. Suppose at least
one agent i has differentiable and strictly monotone preferences:
xˆi − xi ∈ X+ {0} ⇒ pii(xˆi) > pii(xi).
Then, existence of a shadow price λ, together with an optimalxi, ensures that λ [X+ {0}] >
0, λW = 0, and there is no z ∈Zsuch that Wz ∈ X+ {0} with limr>0 pii(ei+ rWz) =
+∞.
Proof. Let xi = ei +Wzi be optimal for the agent who has strictly monotone, smooth
preferences. Since λ is a shadow price, the chain rule gives
0 =
∂
∂zi
pii(ei +Wzi) = λW.
Further, suppose a ticket z ∈Zis variable for a free lunch Wz ∈ X+ {0}, during which
agent i is never satiated: limr>0 pii(ei + rWz) = +∞. This implies the contradiction
pi
(∗)
i (λ) ≥ sup
r>0
{pii(ei +Wz)− λ(ei +Wz)} = +∞. 
Example: A two-stage security market. Let W =
[ −z∗
D
]
where the price vector
z∗ = (z∗j ) ∈ RJ accounts for the up-front purchase cost of various papers j ∈ J , and the
S×J matrixD = [Dj(s)] reports future dividends. WithZ= RJ , equation λW = 0 and
λ > 0 amount to the price rule
z∗j = δ
∫
Dj(s)p(ds) ∀j, (9)
featuring a deflator δ > 0 alongside a risk-neutral probability measure p over F ; see [29]
for S finite. The nature of rule (9) is best appreciated when uncertainty resolves over
several stages. We turn to such instances next. 
Quite often, identification of the true state s isn’t immediate. At time t ∈ {0, 1, .., T}
agent i can only ascertain for each event in a sigma-field Ft ⊆ F whether it has hap-
pened or not. His decision xit, made then, must therefore be Ft-measurable. In that
case X= X0 × · · · ×XT where Xt is a space of Ft-measurable mappings from S into a
Euclidean space E t . Typically, the inclusions
{∅, S} = F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ FT = F (10)
hold; they represent progressive acquisition of knowledge.
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Example: A multi-stage security market. Suppose S is finite, and let each field Ft
be generated by a partition Pt of S. Then xt : S → E t is Ft-measurable iff constant on
each part Pt ∈ Pt. Posit P0 = {S} and PT = {{s} : s ∈ S}. Regard Pt ∈ Pt as a node
nt ∈ Nt (at height t) in a tree, and draw a directed branch from nt to its child node nt+1
iff nt = Pt ⊆ Pt+1 = nt+1. Write nt ∈ A(nt+1) and nt+1 ∈ C(nt) to signal that the first
node is an ancestor and the latter a child. Node n0 is named the root, and each terminal
node - having maximal height T - is called a leaf ; see figure below.
root n0 =

 ss′
s′′

 ր
ց
[
s
s′
]
[s′′]
ր
→
→
[s]
[s′]
[s′′]

 leafs
Legend: A tree with 3 partitions/stages/states/scenarios and 6 nodes.
Denote by zjn ∈ R the number of shares an investor holds in paper j ∈ J upon leaving
node n. Suppose he buys (outgoing) portfolio zn := (zjn) ∈ RJ at node n 6= n0 and
liquidates there the (incoming) portfolio zA(n) bought at the ancestor node. Absent trans-
action costs, those operations bring him nominal, current gainGn(z) := z∗n ·
[
zA(n) − zn
]
.
(The dot denotes the standard inner product.) At the root node n0 naturally let Gn0(z) :=
−z∗n0 · zn0 . This stylized market allows arbitrage iff the system
Gn(z) ≥ 0 for all n and z∗n · zn ≥ 0 for each leaf , (11)
admits a solution z = (zn) with at least one strict inequality. Suppose some paper (say a
bond) b ∈ J commands strictly positive price z∗nb at each node n. In terms of that paper
define discount factors δn := z∗n0b/z
∗
nb. Let N := ∪tNt denote the node set.
Proposition (Shadow prices and risk-neutral probabilities). The described market, fea-
turing many stages, is arbitrage-free iff there exists a strictly positive probability measure
p across the leafs such that the transition probabilities, induced by p on the entire node
set, satisfy the martingale condition
δnz
∗
n = Eµ [δcz
∗
c |n] =
∑
c∈C(n)
δcz
∗
cp(c |n) for all non-terminal n. (12)
Under the hypotheses of the preceding proposition any shadow price ensures absence of
arbitrage.
Proof. The first part is well known but proven for completeness. Fix any non-degenerate
probability measure m > 0 across the leafs, and use the induced probabilities mn at
non-terminal nodes n. Consider the homogeneous linear program
max
z
∑
n
δnmnGn(z) +
∑
n∈NT
δnmnz
∗
n · zn s.t. (11). (13)
Clearly, the market is arbitrage-free iff the optimal value of (13) is 0. Associate multiplier
δnyn ≥ 0 to inequalityGn(z) ≥ 0, and δnYn ≥ 0 to leaf constraint z∗n·zn ≥ 0.Maximizing
the resulting Lagrangian∑
n
δn(mn + yn)Gn(z) +
∑
n∈NT
δn(mn + Yn)z
∗
n · zn =
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∑
n/∈NT

 ∑
c∈C(n)
δc(mc + yc)z
∗
c − δn(mn + yn)z∗n

 · zn + ∑
n∈NT
δn(Yn − yn)z∗n · zn (14)
with respect to the free variable z we see that the dual of (13) amounts to solve
δn(mn + yn)z
∗
n =
∑
c∈C(n)
δc(mc + yc)z
∗
c for all n /∈ NT with y ≥ 0.
Suppose the latter system is indeed solvable. In that case, by LP duality, problem (13) has
0 as optimal value, and there are no arbitrage opportunities. Then consider component b
of the last equation to get mn + yn =
∑
c∈C(n)(mc + yc). Therefore m(c |n) := (mc +
yc)/(mn + yn) defines strictly positive transition probabilities that satisfy (12).
Conversely, suppose some strictly positive measure m on NT suits (12). In (14) let
m = p and each yn, Yn = 0 to get
∑
n
δnGn(z)pn +
∑
n∈NT
δnz
∗
n · znpn =
∑
n/∈NT

 ∑
c∈C(n)
δcpcz
∗
c − δnpnz∗n

 · zn = 0
for all z. Thus arbitrage is impossible.
For the final assertion, let X= RN×RNT with the customary non-negative orthant
X+. PositZ:= RJ×N , and define the linear operator W :Z→ Xby
Wz =
[
[Gn(z)]n∈N , [z
∗
nzn]n∈NT
]
.
Absence of arbitrage means that no z ∈Zyields Wz ∈ X+0. By the preceding proposi-
tion there exists a positive λ such that λW = 0. Choose yn ≥ 0 to have λn = δn(µn+ yn)
for n ∈ N and posit Yn = yn at leaf n. Consequently, (14) becomes feasible. 
Example: Two-stage risk-neutral pricing. If available up front, how much is the risk-
free asset worth that offers guaranteed future dividend 1? As seen next λ complies with
the well known risk-neutral, arbitrage-free evaluation:
Suppose there are merely two stages with {∅, S} = F0 ⊂ F1 = F and only one
commodity (E = R). Given a shadow price λ 	 0 a.s., suppose the system
b := (b0, b1) = (−δ, 1) and λb = 0,
is solvable for some riskless bond b ∈ X together with a unique discount factor δ > 0.
Then, δ =
∫
S
λ(s)µ(ds)/λ(0), and the measure
p(A) :=
∫
A
λ(s)µ(ds)/
∫
S
λ(s)µ(ds)
defines a risk-neutral probability p over F that satisfies −x(0) = δ ∫
S
x(s)p(ds) for each
x ∈ Xsuch that λx = 0.
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7 Risk Sharing
We stress that states can sometimes be seen not as ”events” but alternatively as ”stages”
or decision epochs.17 The measure µ then discounts the future. More generally, the
description of any specific state refers to the circumstances that defines its appearance.
This more broad perspective justifies speaking of any x ∈ Xas a contingent commodity
bundle in E .
In either set-up sharing, as captured by (1), takes the form of a contract, specifying
agent i’s part xi(s) of eI(s), and his payment, in state s. A natural question is whether and
when the concerned parties think the writing of such contracts worth their while. Instead
of committing to a promise or policy right away, why not just wait and see?
Clearly, what explains and justifies the existence of insurance institutions is the tempo-
ral resolution of uncertainty - and the time windows that affect some decisions. Intuitively,
if the restriction x ∈ Xdoes not preclude that x(s) be fully adapted to the realized state
s ex post - and moreover, agents agree on probabilities - then contracts seem superfluous.
This exceptional setting is briefly explored next.
Following [33] declareXdecomposable iff for each x ∈ Xthe modified mapping
1Bβ + 1SBx :=
{
β if s ∈ B
x otherwise
belongs to Xwhenever the bounded β : S → E is measurable, and B ∈ F . Further,
call an integrand Π : S × E → R∪{−∞} normal if the point-to-set correspondence
s 7→ {(e, r) ∈ E ×R : Π(s, e) ≥ r} is measurable [33].
Decomposability is demanding. For instance, when S is finite, and F contains all
singletons, a decomposable Xmust generate a complete market space. That is, seen as
space of marketable assets, a decomposable X contains all elementary Arrow-Debreu
securities. Also, if Ft ( F for some t < T in (10), choose a bounded F -measurable
βt : S → E t which is not Ft-measurable. Posit βτ ≡ 0 for τ 6= t, and B = S to have
1Bβ + 1SBx = β /∈ X.
In short, decomposability doesn’t fit settings where information unfolds gradually.
Despite their lack of realism, the extreme properties of decomposable instances shed some
light on insurance:
Proposition (Sharing ex post, on the spot). Suppose Xis decomposable. For each i ∈ I,
let
pii(xi) =
∫
Πi(s, xi(s))µ(ds), (15)
featuring a normal integrand Πi : S × E → R∪{−∞} and a common measure µ. If
λ is a shadow price for the overall game, then almost surely so is λ(s) for the ex post,
contingent game that emerges in state s, with characteristic function
C 7→ ΠC(s, eC(s)) := sup
{∑
i∈C
Πi(s, xi(s)) :
∑
i∈C
xi(s) = eC(s)
}
.
17Examples include exchange of time-dependent property rights, say fish quotas or pollution permits.
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Invoking the contingent conjugateΠ(∗)i (s, ·), that ex post game admits a payoff distribution
i 7→ Ui(s, λ(s)) := Π(∗)i (s, λ(s)) + λ(s) · ei(s)
which belongs to its core. Further,
i 7→ ui(λ) =
∫
Ui(s, λ(s))µ(ds) =
∫ {
Π
(∗)
i (s, λ(s)) + λ(s) · ei(s)
}
µ(ds).
belongs to the ex ante core.
Proof. Since objectives are separable across states, for any χ = (χi) ∈ E I and χ∗ ∈ E
coalition C has ex post Lagrangian
LC(s, χ, χ
∗) :=
∑
i∈C
Πi(s, χi) + χ
∗ ·
[∑
i∈C
ei(s)−
∑
i∈C
χi
]
in state s. Ex ante it holds LC(x, x∗) =
∫
LC(s, x(s), x∗(s))µ(ds). Now, by decomposi-
tion,
piI(eI) = sup
x
LI(x, λ) ⇐⇒ ΠI(s, eI(s)) = sup
x(s)
LI(s, x(s), λ(s)) almost surely;
see [33]; Theorem 11.40. Thus λ is a shadow price iff almost surely ΠI(s, eI(s)) equals
supx(s) LI(s, x(s), λ(s)). Hence it equals the saddle value of LI(s, ·, ·). From here on the
argument goes as before. 
Granted a decomposable space X and normal format (15), sharing may almost surely
be done ex post. If moreover, the integrands are state-independent of the form Πi : E →
R∪ {−∞}, the state-s shadow price λ(s) depends only on the realized aggregate eI(s).
As said, the preceding proposition should not lure one into thinking that ex ante con-
tracts are superfluous. Casual observation indicates the opposite. So, decomposability is
a rare property. Most often some component of xi must be decided before uncertainty re-
solves - and stays non-maleable ex post. A simple example is fire insurance: The premium
paid up front cannot be altered after the event.18
It may happen of course, that there is only one stage. Such a setting allows us to
consider instances where players perceive uncertainty diversely. Often probability as-
sessments differ across agents - and typically much on exceptionally important states,
occurring with very low frequencies. Nonetheless, there are prospects for risk sharing -
implemented by contracts signed ex ante. Arguing as in the preceding proposition we get:
Corollary (Diverse probability assessments). For each i ∈ I, suppose pii(xi) =
∫
Πi(s, xi(s))µi(ds)
where Πi is a normal integrand, µi is absolutely continuous with respect to µ, and X is
decomposable. Let ϕi = ddµµi be the corresponding density. Then, λ is shadow price iff
18Along the same line, if knowledge is asymmetric, players may, for the sake of verifiability and ex post
implementation, have to contend with contracts that differ in measurability; see [24].
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almost surely
sup
(χi)
{∑
i∈I
Πi(s, χi)ϕi(s) :
∑
i∈I
χi = eI(s)
}
≥
∑
i∈I
Ui(s, λ(s)) (16)
where
Ui(s, λ(s)) := ϕi(s)Π
(∗)
i (s,
λ(s)
ϕi(s)
) + λ(s) · ei(s)and ui(λ) =
∫
Ui(s, λ(s))µ(ds).
In case allocation (xi) is optimal, λ(·) is a shadow price iff, for each i,
λ(s) ∈ ∂
∂χi
Πi(s, xi(s))ϕi(s) a.s.  (17)
(17) dates back to [8], [37]. The Corollary shows that players who hold different (but
absolutely continuous) beliefs cannot implement the overall contract ex post unless their
realized payoffs be scaled by respective densities. If someone believes a particular state
more likely, its realization should benefit him ex post. The rarity or non-practicality of
decomposable spaces, indicates that one hardly have a realistic theory of syndicates unless
members commit themselves up front.
In general, shadow prices depend on all underlying data. Also, by belonging toX, any
shadow price is a mapping s ∈ S 7−→ λ(s) ∈ E . This raises the question whether s affects
λ(s) merely via eI(s)? If so, λ(·) should be measurable with respect to the sigma-field
F(eI) generated by eI .19 In that case, for simplicity, declare λ adapted. At this juncture
the implicit function theorem immediately yields:
Proposition (Dependence on the aggregate endowment). Let (xˆi) be an optimal allo-
cation for some aggregate endowment eˆI. Suppose each pii is twice continuously differen-
tiable near xˆi with pi
′′
i (xˆi) non-singular. Then, in some neighborhood of eˆI , the system
pi′i(xi) = λ for all i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I
xi = eI
admits continuous solutions eI 7→ xi(eI) ∈ X, i ∈ I, and eI 7→ λ(eI) ∈ X. In particular,
if pii(xi) =
∫
Πi(xi(s))µ(ds) with Πi twice continuously differentiable near xˆi(s) and
Π
′′
i (xˆi(s)) non-singular, then, in some neighborhood of eˆI(s), the system
Π′i(xi) = λ for all i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I
xi = eI(s)
admits continuous solutions eI(s) 7→ xi(eI(s)) ∈ E, i ∈ I, and eI(s) 7→ λ(eI(s)) ∈ E
becomes adapted. 
Since individual payoffs need not be concave, parts of the analysis proceeds without as-
suming risk aversion. To illustrate, we emphasize next one advantage and consequence of
19σ(eI ) is the smallest sigma-field with respect to which eI is measurable.
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having adapted shadow prices. When µ is a probability measure, write E for the expecta-
tion operator.
Proposition. (Mean-preserving shifts are undesirable). Let µ here be a probability mea-
sure. Suppose shadow price λ is adapted and allocation (xi) is optimal.
• If ∆eI ∈ X, satisfying E [∆eI| eI ] = 0, is added to eI , then piI(eI +∆eI) ≤ piI(eI).
• Similarly, if ∆xi ∈ Xwith E [∆xi| eI ] = 0 be added to xi, then pii(xi +∆xi) ≤ pii(xi).
Proof. The subgradient inequality yields piI(eI + ∆eI) ≤ piI(eI) + λ∆eI . However,
since λ depends merely on eI,
λ∆eI = E(λ ·∆eI) = E(E [λ ·∆eI |eI ]) = E(λ · E [∆eI |eI ]) = 0.
The second assertion is proven in the same manner. 
The last two bullets required no risk aversion, only the availability of an adapted shadow
price. Also note that, so far, no properties were required of pii. We still want to avoid
separability, be it over time or events.20 On that account, withXHilbert, it turns out that
a generalized form of variance aversion is expedient.
Lemma (Generalized variance aversion). Consider any inner product xx′ on a Hilbert
space Xwith associated norm ‖·‖ . Suppose a function f : X→ R∪{−∞} and a subset
X∗ ⊂ Xare such that
x∗x˜ = x∗x ∀x∗ ∈ X∗and ‖x˜‖ < ‖x‖ implies f(x+ r(x˜− x)) > f(x) for some real r.
Then, any solution x to (2) belongs to the closed linear subspace of Xspanned by λ and
X∗.
Proof. Let x˜ denote the orthogonal projection of x onto the said subspace. Thus x∗x˜ =
x∗x for all x∗ ∈ X∗. Suppose x˜ 6= x. Then, because x˜(x− x˜) = 0 and ‖x− x˜‖2 > 0,
‖x‖2 = ‖x˜+ x− x˜‖2 = ‖x˜‖2 + 2x˜(x− x˜) + ‖x− x˜‖2 > ‖x˜‖2 ;
that is, ‖x˜‖ < ‖x‖ and thereby f(xˆ) > f(x) with xˆ := x + r(x˜ − x) for some real r.
However, because λxˆ = λx, it holds
f(xˆ)− λxˆ > f(x)− 〈λ, x〉 ,
an inequality which contradicts the maximality of x in (2). The upshot is that x˜ = x, and
the conclusion follows. 
20The finance/insurance literature mostly considers additive, concave, state-independent, smooth payoff
functions of the customary von Neumann-Morgenstern sort. That optic - apart from smoothness - appears
reasonable for low-consequence, conventional risks such as minor damage on cars or theft of bicycles. It
need not, however, fit major events like severe illness or catastrophes. Admittedly, the use of expected pay-
offs is best justified under repeated realizations, these allowing probabilities to be estimated from observed
data. Nothing precludes though, that mutual insurance company be set up to protect its members against
rare events the ”statistics” of which merely reflect expert judgements.
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Proposition (Variance aversion). Let the commodity space E be RG for a finite set G
of economic goods. Suppose each vector 1g ∈ RG, g ∈ G, having 1 in component g and
0 elsewhere, belongs toX⊆ L2. Also suppose a function f :X→ R∪{−∞} is such that
Ex˜ = Ex and var(x˜) < var(x) implies f(x+ r(x˜− x)) > f(x) for some real r.
Then, any solution x to (2) belongs to the linear subspace of X spanned by λ and
{1g : g ∈ G} .
Proof. Use inner product (8). Further, letting X∗ := {1g : g ∈ G} one sees that Ex˜ =
Ex ⇔ x∗x˜ = x∗x ∀x∗ ∈ X∗. Clearly, when Ex˜ = Ex, it holds var(x˜) < var(x) ⇔
‖x˜‖ < ‖x‖ . Now invoke the preceding lemma to conclude. 
As above, declare x ∈ X adapted if measurable with respect to the sigma-field F(eI)
generated by eI.
Proposition (Variance aversion and two-fund separation). Suppose there exists a shadow
price and that eI is not constant. Let the commodity space E be RG for a finite set
G of economic goods. Suppose each 1g ∈ X⊆ L2 and that every payoff function
pii :X→ R∪{−∞} satisfies
Ex˜ = Ex and var(x˜) < var(x) implies pii(x+ r(x˜− x)) > pii(x) for some real r.
(18)
Then, any optimal allocation (xi) to game (1) is adapted and of the form
xi = ri + εieI
with unique non-random vectors ri ∈ RG and coefficients εi that satisfy ∑i∈I ri = 0 and∑
i∈I εi = 1.
Proof. Fix any shadow price λ. From the preceding proposition xi ∈ V := span
{
R
G, λ
}
hence eI =
∑
i∈I xi ∈ V.Because eI isn’t constant, V= span
{
R
G, eI
}
, and the vectors
1g, g ∈ G, eI form a basis ofV. The conclusion is now immediate. 
Proposition (Risk aversion and contingent two-fund separation). Suppose X⊆ L2. Let
a core allocation (xi) be supported by a shadow price and suppose agent i has payoff of
the form pii(xi) = EΠi(xi) with concave integrands Πi : E → R∪ {−∞}. Then we may
assume xi adapted and there exist adapted ri ∈ Xand εi ∈ R such that
xi = ri + εieI, ri(s) · eI(s) = 0 a.s.
If all agents are of the described sort, ∑i∈I ri = 0, and ∑i∈I εi = 1.
Proof. Denote by λ a shadow price that supports core allocation (xi). Introduce the
conditional expectation x˜i := E [xi |eI ] to have x˜i adapted. Since λ is adapted, we get
λxi = λx˜i. Finally, Jensen’s inequality yields pii(xi) ≤ pii(x˜i). This takes care of the
first assertion. Further, on any atom in F(eI) project xi orthogonally onto ReI to get a
unique component εieI along that line, and let ri be the residual. Since
∑
i xi = eI, the
conclusion follows. 
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8 Price Curves and Risk Tolerance
The correspondence eI 7→ λ(eI) from aggregate endowment to shadow price may natu-
rally be seen as a price curve. As such its should ”slope downwards”:
Proposition (The law of demand). Shadow prices comply with the law of demand in
that
(λ− λˆ)(e− eˆ) ≤ 0 (19)
whenever λ ∈ ∂piI(e) and λˆ ∈ ∂piI(eˆ).
Proof. λ ∈ ∂piI(e) implies piI(eˆ) ≤ piI(e) + λ(eˆ − e). Similarly, λˆ ∈ ∂piI(e) implies
piI(e) ≤ piI(eˆ) + λˆ(e− eˆ). Addition of the last two inequalities gives (19). 
As customary, given a price curve, its slope is of chief importance.
Proposition (The slope of the price curve). Let (xi) be an optimal allocation supported by
a shadow price λ. For each i, suppose pii is concave with a second Fre´chet derivative near
xi which is continuous and non-singular at xi.Then pi(∗)I is twice Fre´chet differentiable at
λ with
pi(∗)I
′′(λ) = −
∑
i∈I
pi′′i (xi)
−1. (20)
In addition, if for each i, pi′′i is continuous near xi, then (pi(∗)I )′′ is continuous near λ. If
moreover, (pi∗I)
′′ is non-singular at λ, the market curve has slope
λ′(eI) = piI
′′(
∑
i∈I
xi) =
[∑
i∈I
pi′′i (xi)
−1
]−1
. (21)
Under these conditions individual demand xi = xi(eI) is differentiable and
x′i = pi
′′
i (xi)
−1piI
′′(xI) where xI :=
∑
i∈I
xi (22)
Proof. We use the following result on inversion [12]: If x∗ = f ′(x) with f concave, twice
Fre´chet differentiable near x and f ′′(x) non-singular, it holds
f (∗)′′(x∗) = −f ′′(x)−1
with f (∗)′′ continuous near x∗ when f ′′ is continuous near x.Here, since pi(∗)I =
∑
i∈I pi
(∗)
i ,
we get pi(∗)′′I =
∑
i∈I pi
(∗)′′
i whenever the last sum is well defined. Thus (20) follows. In-
voking the above inversion result once again, pi(∗)I ′′(λ) = −pi′′I (eI)−1 and (21) obtains.
Finally, (22) is a direct consequence of differentiating pi′i(xi) = pi′I(eI). 
For a function pi : R→ R Pratt [32] described risk aversion as twice the premium per
unit of infinitesimal variance. Provided pi be sufficiently smooth at x, with pi′(x) 6= 0,
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the said premium Api(x) := −pi′′(x)/pi′(x) is called the absolute risk aversion at x. The
reciprocal entity Tpi(x) := −pi′′(x)−1pi′(x), called risk tolerance, is thus half the tolerable
variance per unit of compensating premium [37]. The latter entity is often more amenable
to handle. Here however, payoff functions may be defined on higher-dimensional spaces.
Accordingly, a multi-dimensional version of risk tolerance.
When there is only one good (E = R), differential equation (22) amounts to
x′i = Ti(xi)/TI(xI) (23)
where Ti := Tpii and TI := TpiI . Solutions to (23) have been studied in [9], [10], [26], [38].
Definition (Risk tolerance). For any function f, mapping E or X into R ∪ {−∞} that
has a non-singular second Fre´chet derivative at x, define its risk tolerance at x as
Tf(x) := − [f ′′(x)]−1 f ′(x).
Corollary (Aggregate and individual risk tolerances). Under the conditions of the pre-
ceding proposition,
TpiI (
∑
i∈I
xi) =
∑
i∈I
Tpii(xi).
Similarly, if for each i, pii(xi) =
∫
Πi(xi(s))µ(ds) with state-independent integrand Πi :
E → R∪{−∞} and a measure µ > 0,
TΠI (
∑
i∈I
χi) =
∑
i∈I
TΠi(χi).
Proof. From (21) follows [piI ′′(eI)]−1 =
∑
i∈I pi
′′
i (xi)
−1. Apply the left hand operator on
the antigradient a := −pi′I(eI) to get TpiI (eI). Apply the right operator on the same object
a = −pi′i(xi) to conclude. 
9 Examples
This section provides a set of examples. Since conjugate functions are central, we first
sample a few of them, emphasizing for each function f its effective domain f−1(R), de-
noted domf. The second part of the section displays some games.
Conjugate functions: Note that if f(x) = ϕ(c0(x−x0))+lx+c1,withϕ : X→ R∪{−∞},
a linear l : X→ R, a fixed vector x0 ∈ X, and real constants c0 6= 0, c1, then
f (∗)(x∗) = ϕ(∗)(c−10 (x
∗ − l)) + (l− x∗)x0 + c1.
Thus, one may easily account for the effect of scaling, adding affine functions, or trans-
lating the space.
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Examples of uni-variate conjugate functions f : R→ R∪{−∞} : For any number
p > 0 define its conjugate number p∗ by 1
p
+ 1
p∗
= 1.
function f(x) domf conjugate function f (∗)(x∗) domf (∗)
− |x|p /p, p > 1 R |x∗|p∗ /p∗ R
− |x|p /p, p > 1 R+ |max {0,−x∗}|p∗ /p∗ R
|x|p /p, 0 < p < 1 R+ −(x∗)p∗/p∗ R++
−√1 + x2 R −√1− (x∗)2 [−1, 1]
log x R++ −1− log x∗ R++
− exp(−x) R
{
x∗ log x∗ − x∗ when x∗ > 0
0 when x∗ = 0
R+
Associated prices and choices:
payoff pi λ = pi′(x) = x = −pi(∗)′(λ) =
− |x|p /p, p > 1, x ∈ R − |x|p/p∗ − |λ|p∗/p
− |x|p /p, p > 1, x ≥ 0 − |x|p/p∗
{
λp
∗/p when λ < 0
0 otherwise
|x|p /p, 0 < p < 1, x ≥ 0 xp/p∗ −λp∗/p, λ > 0.
−√1 + x2 −x/√1 + x2 λ/√1− λ2
log x, x > 0 1/x 1/λ
− exp(−x), x ∈ R e−x − logλ
Piecewise linear concave functions: Any proper, upper semicontinuous, concave func-
tion f : X→ R∪{−∞} equals the pointwise infimum of a family of affine functions. In
computation - or for practical purposes - important instances have the said family finite.
So, consider a finite set J of linear functionals x∗j :X→ R, and constants rj ∈ R, and let
f(x) := min
{
x∗jx+ rj : j ∈ J
}
. (24)
Proposition (The conjugate of a piecewise linear concave function). Suppose the real-
valued function f is piece-wise linear on a reflexive Banach space X - and given by
formula (24). Then
f (∗)(x∗) = inf
{∑
j∈J
r∗j rj : r
∗
j ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
r∗j = 1,
∑
j∈J
r∗jx
∗
j = x
∗
}
,
with the understanding that inf ∅ = +∞. Thus, f (∗)(x∗) = +∞ iff x∗ /∈ conv {x∗j : j ∈ J} .
WhenXis finite-dimensional, it suffices to have at most dimX+1 coefficients r∗j > 0.
Proof. Recall that for any finite set {ρj : j ∈ J} ⊂ R it holds
min {ρj : j ∈ J} = min
{∑
j∈J
r∗jρj : r
∗
j ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
r∗j = 1
}
.
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Consequently,
f (∗)(x∗) = sup
ρ≥0
sup
‖x‖≤ρ
{
min
j∈J
(x∗jx+ rj)− x∗x
}
= sup
ρ≥0
sup
‖x‖≤ρ
{
min
{
(
∑
j∈J
r∗jx
∗
j − x∗)x+
∑
j∈J
r∗j rj : r
∗
j ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
r∗j = 1
}}
= sup
ρ≥0
min
r∗
sup
‖x‖≤ρ
{
(
∑
j∈J
r∗jx
∗
j − x∗)x+
∑
j∈J
r∗j rj : r
∗
j ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
r∗j = 1
}
= sup
ρ≥0
min
r∗
{∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈J
r∗jx
∗
j − x∗
∥∥∥∥∥ ρ+
∑
j∈J
r∗j rj : r
∗
j ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
r∗j = 1
}
= inf
{∑
j∈J
r∗j rj : r
∗
j ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
r∗j = 1,
∑
j∈J
r∗jx
∗
j = x
∗
}
. 
For example, when J = {1, 2} and f(x) := min {x∗1x+ r1, x∗2x+ r2} , we get
f (∗)(x∗) = inf {r∗1r1 + r∗2r2 : r∗1, r∗2 ≥ 0, r∗1 + r∗2 = 1, r∗1x∗1 + r∗2x∗2 = x∗} .
The particular instanceX= R and f(x) = − |x| = min{−x,+x} gives f (∗)(x∗) = 0 if
x∗ ∈ [−1,+1] and f (∗)(x∗) = +∞ otherwise.
Linear-quadratic functions: Let Xbe a Hilbert space with inner product 〈·, ·〉 and posit
f(x) = −〈x,Ax〉/2 with A symmetric and positive semidefinite. If A is non-singular
surjective, then
f (∗)(x∗) =
1
2
〈
x∗, A−1x∗
〉
.
More generally, suppose the range of A is closed. Then
f (∗)(x∗) =
{
1
2
〈x∗, x〉 when x∗ ∈ rangeA and x ∈ A−1x∗
+∞ otherwise.
Extending to the linear-quadratic case f(x) = −〈x,Ax〉 /2 + 〈a, x〉 + α, with rangeA
closed, we obtain
f (∗)(x∗) =
{
1
2
〈x∗ − a, x〉+ α when x ∈ A−1(x∗ − a)
+∞ when x∗ − a /∈ rangeA.
Letting A† denote the pseudo-inverse of A we get f (∗)(x∗) = 1
2
〈
x∗ − a,A†(x∗ − a)〉+α
when x∗ − a ∈ RangeA, and f (∗)(x∗) = +∞ otherwise; see [4] or [33].
A multi-stage, stochastic, production game: Agent i ∈ I must make a Ft-measurable
decision zit ∈ Zit at time t = 0, ..., T . The production plan zi = (zit) gives him payoff
fi(zi) subject to
gi(zi) :=


gi0(zi0)
gi1(zi0, zi1)
.
.
.
giT (zi0, ..., ziT)
≤


ei0
ei1
.
.
.
eiT
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Here git(zi0, ..., zit) ≤ eit is shorthand for inequality git(s, zi0(s), ..., zit(s)) ≤ eit(s) ∈ E t
holding almost surely, with git(s, zi0(s), ..., zit(s)) presumed Ft-measurable.
In condensed form, i faces the problem to maximize fi(zi) s.t. gi(zi) ≤ ei. Thus game
format (6) emerges again. Note that a shadow price λ assumes the form (λ0, ..., λT ), its
time-t component λt being a Ft-measurable function s ∈ S 7→ λt(s) with values in the
non-negative cone (E t)+.
Linear, stochastic production games: Specializing on the stochastic production game
just outlined, let µ be a probability measure and
fi(zi) := z
∗
i zi := E(z∗i · zi) = E
T∑
t=0
z∗it · zit,
zit belonging to the non-negative cone Zit in some Euclidean space Zit. The random
evaluation vector z∗it ∈Zit is Ft-measurable. Posit
git(zi0, ..., zit) :=
t∑
τ=0
Aiτ tziτ
for Fτ -measurable matrices Aiτ t of appropriate size. Then gi(zi) ≤ ei iff Aizi ≤ ei where
the block matrix
Ai :=


Ai00 0 0 ...
Ai01 Ai11 0 ...
Ai02 Ai12 Ai22 0
... ... ... ...


has transpose A∗i . Now (6) amounts to
piC(eC) := max
{∑
i∈C
z∗i zi :
∑
i∈C
Aizi ≤ eC with Ft-measurable zit ≥ 0
}
. (25)
λ is a shadow price iff it solves the grand dual problem:
max λeI s.t. A∗iλ ≥ z∗i for each i and λ ≥ 0.
In the corresponding core solution agent i receives payment ui = λei only for his endow-
ment.
Linear-quadratic market games: Posit pii(xi) = −12 〈xi, Aixi〉 + 〈ai, xi〉 with ai ∈ X,
and a symmetric, positive definite matrix Ai that defines a linear auto-transformation on
X. Thus, with pii strictly concave, agent i is strictly risk averse. Choose C = I and take
supremum in (1) to have xi = A−1i (ai − λ). So, summing across the agents,
λ =
[∑
i∈I
A−1i
]−1∑
i∈I
{
A−1i ai − ei
}
.
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Consequently, two-fund separation and linear sharing obtain in that
xi = ai + bi where
ai := A
−1
i
{
ai −
[∑
j A
−1
j
]−1∑
j A
−1
j aj
}
and
bi := A
−1
i
[∑
i∈I A
−1
i
]−1
eI
with
∑
i∈I ai = 0,
∑
i∈I bi = eI . If each ai is constant, then that ai is risk-free whereas
bi equals a share of the aggregate risk; the ”larger” Ai the smaller bi. 
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